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The Clash of Outrage and the First Amendment:
The Protection of Non-Mainstream Opinion
Lawrence A. Epter*

-I.

INTRODUCTION

"I think that the First Amendment gives me the right to be offensive, and that's what the issue is here. My indictment is basically for bad taste."' Is Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler magazine, correct in his description of the protection afforded
publishers by the first amendment to the federal constitution? The
Supreme Court of the United States answered this question with a
resounding yes when it decided the case of Falwell v. Flynt.2 The
Court unanimously reversed the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,3 which upheld a Virginia
federal district court's award of $200,000 against Flynt and Hustler
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.4 What makes
the Fourth Circuit's decision constitutionally significant is that it
represents the first time in our legal history that a public figure
recovered damages under the tort of emotional distress after failing to recover for defamation because the communication was held
to be opinion, not fact.5 Therefore, this case created an issue of
* Mr. Epter is a member of the California State Bar specializing in entertainment related civil litigation at the law firm of Greenberg, Glusker, Fields, Claman & Machtinger in
Los Angeles, California.
1. Nightline: Court Battle: Falwell v. Flynt (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 2, 1987)
(statement of Hustler publisher Larry Flynt).
2. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
3. 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
4. Id. at 1277.
5. Id. at 1275. At trial, the jury found that a reader could not reasonably believe that
the parody appearing in Hustler magazine was describing actual facts about Jerry Falwell.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 27:437

first impression for the Supreme Court: Can a public figure circumvent the absolute constitutional protection of opinion,' as well as
the New York Times actual malice standard,7 which has evolved
Id.
6. The opinion doctrine mandates that rhetorical hyperbole and opinion are absolutely
protected by the first amendment. See generally Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v.
Bressler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974). For a discussion of these cases, as well as the evolution of the
doctrine, see infra notes 8-43 and accompanying text.
This article will refer to the level of constitutional protection guaranteed by the opinion
doctrine as "absolute." It should be pointed out, however, that this first amendment principle is subject to limitations. A detailed discussion of these principles is beyond the scope of
this Article. However, a brief summary may prove useful.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), the Supreme Court held that "vulgar,
offensive and shocking" speech is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection in all
circumstances. Id. at 747. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Court
allowed criminal prosecution for the use of "fighting words," defined as those words which
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace or inflict injury by their very utterance. Id.
at 571-72. In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Court reaffirmed that obscene
material is not protected by the first amendment. Id. at 23. The Court enunciated the following guidelines for the trier of fact to determine whether material is obscene:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24.
7. The reference here is, of course, to the landmark first amendment case of New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times went to the Supreme Court as an
appeal from a libel judgment of $500,000 won by L.B. Sullivan, the police commissioner of
Montgomery, Alabama. Id. at 256. The allegedly libelous material consisted of statements
contained in a full-page advertisement entitled, "Heed Their Rising Voices" which appeared
on March 29, 1960. Id. The ad charged that instances of police misconduct, brutality and
intimidation occurred in Alabama against Dr. Martin Luther King and others involved in
the 1960's civil rights movement. Id. at 256-58. The text concluded by soliciting funds to
support the struggle for the right to vote, student movement, and the legal defense of Dr.
King against a perjury indictment then pending in Montgomery. Id. at 257. Although Sullivan was never mentioned by name, he contended that any references to police activity in
Montgomery would be imputed to him since he supervised the Police Department. Id. at
258. The trial judge instructed the jury that these statements, some of which were false,
were "libelous per se" legal injury which would be implied without proof of actual damages.
Id. at 262.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment, focusing centrally on the
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270. Because critical discussion of government often involves attacks on or criticisms of individual
officials as well as government policy generally, all defamation claims of aggrieved public
officials must undergo heightened scrutiny to minimize the potential "chilling effect" and
great danger of self-censorship. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-12 at 634 (citing
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292). Reversing the Alabama court's decision, the Court struck
a balance between protection from reputational harm and open, robust debate by announc-
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under the tort of defamation, by bringing a cause of action under
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress? The Court's
answer here was unequivocal-absolutely not.
This Article explores the clash of outrage and the first amendment. Section II traces the historical evolution of the opinion doctrine, looks at several contemporary cases and delves into the standards and tests which have developed to distinguish statements of
fact from opinion. Section III summarizes the facts of Falwell v.
Flynt and analyzes the issues they raise, as well as the Supreme
Court's resolution of the matter. Section III also discusses several
variations on the Falwell scenario and analyzes whether Falwell's
emotional distress claim would have been successful if not constitutionally defeated. Section IV concludes the article by summarizing its major points.
II.

OPINION AND RHETORICAL HYPERBOLE ARE ENTITLED TO

ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION

A.

HistoricalDevelopment of the Opinion Doctrine

The opinion doctrine emerged in 1970 when the Supreme Court
decided the case of Greenbelt Cooperative PublishingAssociation
v. Bresler.8 In Greenbelt, Bresler, a prominent local real estate developer who was also a member of the Maryland House of Delegates, sued the publishers of a small weekly newspaper for defamation.' His status as a "public figure" was undisputed. 0 At public
meetings, Bresler engaged in vigorous negotiations with the Greenbelt City Council to secure zoning variances for certain land he
ing the oft-cited "actual malice standard:"
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' - that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
8. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
9. Id. at 7-8.
10. Id. at 8-9.
In the present case Bresler's counsel conceded in his opening statement to the jury
that Bresler was a public figure in the community. Bresler was deeply involved in the
future development of the city of Greenbelt. . . . Negotiations of significant public
concern were in progress, both with school officials and the city council. Bresler's
status thus clearly fell within even the most restrictive definition of a "public figure."

Id.
This distinction is of particular significance to an analogical analysis of Falwell v. Flynt
which is contained infra at notes 88-115.
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owned while the city was trying to acquire other land owned by
Bresler for the construction of a new high school." Extensive litigation regarding compensation for the school site seemed highly
probable unless Bresler and the city authorities could come to an
agreement on its price.1 2 These negotiations evoked considerable
controversy, including several turbulent city council meetings at
which many community members expressed their views. 13 Two
news articles reported that some people at the public meetings had
characterized Bresler's position as "blackmail."' 4 The word appeared several times, with and without quotations, including its
use as a subheading within a news story. 15 As a result of these stories, Bresler sued the publisher for libel, primarily claiming that
the articles imputed the crime of blackmail to him.' 6 At trial, the
jury found in favor of Bresler, which judgment was affirmed by the
7
Maryland Court of Appeals.'
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed the decision in Greenbelt
and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals of Maryland for
further proceedings not inconsistent with its decision. 8 Significantly, the Court stated that no one reading either article could
have thought that the commission of a criminal offense was being
imputed to Bresler.'9 In the Court's words: "On the contrary, even
the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no
more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those
who considered Bresler's negotiating position extremely unreasonable."2 0 Since this case involved newspaper reports of public meetings of citizens concerned with local matters, it is of great first
amendment concern. 2' The Court continued: "The maintenance of
11. 398 U.S. at 6-7.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7-8 and 16-18.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Id. Bresler was awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages and $12,500 in punitive
damages. Id.
18. Id. at 15.
19. Id. at 14. The Court further opined that there was no evidence in the record that
anyone thought Bresler had been charged with a crime. Id. Under Maryland law, blackmail
entails "threatening to accuse any person of an indictable crime or of anything which, if
true, would bring the person into contempt or disrepute, with a view to extorting money,
goods, or things of value." Id. at 14 n.7 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 561-563 (1967 Repl.
Vol.)). Nothing in any of the articles even remotely alleges that Bresler engaged in this type
of conduct. 398 U.S. at 14-18.
20. Id. at 14.
21. Id. at 11.
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the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes
may be obtained by lawful means . . . is a fundamental principle
of our constitutional system."22 Therefore, to permit infliction of
liability in Greenbelt would have undermined the meaning of a
2
free press, protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. 8
Although Greenbelt took place in the context of a defamation
action, the opinion doctrine does not represent an interpretation of
common-law tort doctrine.2 ' Rather, the Court was enunciating a
constitutional doctrine-that the first amendment forbids institution of tort penalties for expressions that no reasonable reader
could understand as a statement of fact.2 5 Therefore, as a matter of
constitutional law, not tort law, statements of opinion are absolutely protected from successful tort prosecution.
Several years after the Greenbelt decision, the Court reiterated
the opinion doctrine when it decided Old Dominion Branch No.
496, National Association of Letter Carriersv. Austin. 2s The claim
in Letter Carrierswas very similar to Bresler's in Greenbelt.27 The
Old Dominion Branch ("Branch") published a list of those who
had not yet joined the union under the heading "List of Scabs" in
its monthly union newsletter.2 8 In addition to the usual identification of "scabs," the June issue of the newsletter contained the following definition of "scab:"
The Scab
After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had
some awful substance left with which He made a scab.
A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination backbone of jelly and glue. Where others have hearts, he carries a
tumor of rotten principles.
When a scab comes down the street, men turn their backs and Angels weep
in Heaven, and the Devil shuts the gates of hell to keep him out.
No man (or woman) has a right to scab so long as there is a pool of water to
22. Id. (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
23. Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 14.
24. Brief Amicus Curiae of Richmond Newspapers, Inc., and the Free Lance - Star
Publishing Company at 9, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
25. Id. The Court explicitly framed its opinion in terms of constitutional jurispru-

dence. Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 13-14. "For the reasons that follow, we hold that the imposition of liability on such a basis was constitutionally impermissable - that as a matter of
constitutional law, the word 'blackmail' in these circumstances was not slander when spoken and not libel when reported in the Greenbelt News Review." Id. at 13 (emphasis
added).
26. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
27. Id. at 284-85.
28. Id. at 267.
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drown his carcass in, or a rope long enough to hang his body with. Judas
was a gentleman compared with a scab. For betraying his Master, he had
character enough to hang himself. A scab has not.
Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage. Judas sold his Savior for
thirty pieces of silver. Benedict Arnold sold his country for a promise of a
commission in the British Army. The scab sells his birthright, country, his
wife, his children and his fellowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his
employer.
Esau was a traitor to himself; Judas was a traitor to his God; Benedict Arnold was a traitor to his country; a SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his class.2"

As a result, several of those on the "scab" list in the June issue
brought libel actions against local and national letter carriers' unions.80 The basis of their suit was that the definition of a "scab"
charged them with lacking "character," having "rotten principles"
and being "traitor[s];" that these charges were false; and that the
Branch knew they were false when it published the newsletter.3 1
An unpersuaded Court reversed a damage award which had been
upheld by the Supreme Court of Virginia."2
The first step in the Court's analysis was to determine whether
there was a false statement of fact. 3 This is of particular constitutional analytical significance. Only upon a finding that the communication in question consists of fact, not opinion, will analysis continue. 34 Therefore, the threshold question of first amendment
analysis centers around whether the opinion doctrine will absolutely protect the speech at issue.
Not surprisingly, the Court invoked the opinion doctrine in Letter Carriers. The Court stated that it was inconceivable to think
that any reader could have understood the newsletter to be imputing the crime of treason to those on the "scab" list.3 5 Additionally,
29. Id. at 267-68.
30. Id. at 264.
31. Id. at 283.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 284.
34. "Before the test of reckless or knowing falsity can be met, there must be a false
statement of fact." Id. at 284 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974)).
35. 418 U.S. at 285. Moreover, it was clear to the Court that the treason issue was
never even a concern of the appellees:
On the contrary, it is apparent from the record that the basis for the libel action in
this case was the use of the epithet "scab" rather than the claimed charge of treason.
It was the publication of the "List of Scabs" which disturbed the appellees, and
which moved apellee Austin to complain prior to the June publication at issue and to
threaten to sue if he was called a scab again. Moreover, it appears that the only asserted damage to appellees followed from the publication of the fact that they were
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the definition of "scab" is "merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty
and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union members
towards those who refuse to join. ' ' - 6 The Court also found that use
of the particular word "scab" could not be a successful basis of
recovery considering that this description was literally and factually true since a generally accepted definition of "scab" is "one who
refuses to join a union, '' 7 and there was no dispute that those
listed refused to join the Branch."8
In terms of constitutional analysis, there is a crucial distinction
which must be made regarding the Greenbelt and Letter Carriers
decisions. While the allegedly defamed party in Greenbelt was unquestionably a "public figure,"3 " the parties bringing suit in Letter
Carriersclearly did not fall within even the broadest definition of
that category. Therefore, the Court's decision in Letter Carriers
represents an extension of the opinion doctrine to private individuals. Accordingly, one need not engage in any discussion of whether
the plaintiff is a public or private figure when considering constitutional protection of opinion, for speech falling within that category
is protected against everyone. Only upon a failure of the opinion
doctrine to protect the speech may a categorization of the plaintiff
become necessary in order to determine the appropriate intent
standard which the plaintiff will have to prove regarding the defendant's actions.'0
The jurisprudential mindset which pervades the opinion doctrine is best expressed in the case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Incorporated."' There the Court stated that:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea [opinion].
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not
"scabs." Appellees testified only that their coworkers and others became hostile to
them, referring to them as the "scabs" the union was talking about and that this
made them tense and nervous and caused headaches. There is no evidence that anyone took literally the use of the word "traitor" or that appellees were in any way
concerned about or affected by this charge.
Id. at 285 n.16.
36. Id. at 286.
37. Id. at 283 (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged
ed. 1961)).
38. 418 U.S. at 282-83.
39. For a discussion of Bresler's status as a public figure, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
40. The categorization of one as a "public figure" or "public official" will necessitate
that the plaintiff prove New York Times' actual malice. For a discussion of this standard,
see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
41. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of2other ideas.
But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.

Although many opinions or non-factual statements may be considered by particular individuals to be valueless, offensive or even
outrageous, there is a much broader principle at work. It is the
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open...."13
Unpopular opinions and expressions of yesterday very often become the accepted and valued contemporary standards of today. If
American law were to allow suppression of some opinions and survival of others, common sense dictates that juries would more
readily suppress opinions and ideas outside of the mainstream.
But, reiteration or elaboration of accepted standards and ideas
leads to, at best, greater understanding. No one can deny that the
"mainstream opinion" is of value and must be protected. Equally
as important from a societal perspective, however, is the "nonmainstream opinion" since it is the kind most likely to encourage
provocative thought and change. Moreover, this class of opinion
needs legal protection more than the "mainstream opinion," since
the latter is less likely to form the basis of a lawsuit.
B.

Contemporary Applications of the Opinion Doctrine

While the major cases that established the opinion doctrine were
decided in the 1970s, several contemporary cases have reiterated
with vigor its application as a constitutional safeguard." National
Rifle Association v. Dayton Newspapers, Incorporated is illus42. Id. at 339-40, quoted in National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F.
Supp. 1299, 1304 (1983).
43. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
44. See, e.g., Falwell v. Flynt, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988) (discussed infra at notes 88-115
and accompanying text); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) (parody of song "When
Sunny Gets Blue" could not be reasonably understood in defamatory sense and is therefore
not actionable); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983) (constitutional privilege for
opinion applies in defamation actions brought by private and public persons); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., -695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982) (discussed infra at notes 57-77 and accompanying text); Information Control v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1980) (statements of opinion not actionable); Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170
Cal. App. 3d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1985) (claims against comedic works may be summarily dismissed if not fairly susceptible of defamatory meaning); Crawford v. United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO, 230 Va. 217, 335 S.E.2d 828 (1985) (use of words "cocksucker" and
"motherfucker" during labor dispute cannot reasonably be understood to convey false representations of fact); National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) (discussed infra at notes 45-56 and accompanying text).
45. 555 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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trative of this point. The matter in question in NRA consisted of
statements within an editorial entitled "NRA again murders good
sense."4 6 The editorial was disdainful and sharply critical of the
NRA's opposition to the nomination of Norval Morris, an advocate
of more stringent gun control, 47 for the position of Administrator
of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.48
The NRA alleged that the following untrue statements of fact
were published by Dayton Newspapers, Inc. in its editorial:
Said editorial stated as fact that Plaintiff, National Rifle Association, happily encourages murders and robberies ......
Said editorial intended to convey as fact that the National Rifle Association,
to sell guns and acquire financing from the manufacturers of guns, happily
encourages murders and robberies: by promoting the sale of guns to known
criminals and assassins, such as Lee Harvey Oswald, the Reverend Jim
Jones and Richard Speck; by promoting the sale of guns to assorted punks
for use in robbing gas stations, convenience stores and individual citizens of
their assets; and by acting to prevent the police and courts from concentrating on these crimes; while continuing to sell guns and express false sorrow
for the victims of the crimes it encourages.'0

Regarding employment of the phrase "the murders and robberies the NRA so happily encourages," the court held that this represented "nothing more than a resort to the type of caustic bombast
traditionally used in editorial writing to stimulate public reaction." 50 Additionally, the court found that, especially in light of the
ironic and sarcastic tone that consistently pervades the editorial,
the phrase could not logically be interpreted to be asserting statements of fact about the NRA.5 1
With respect to the NRA's other allegations, the court felt that
46. Id. at 1300.
47. Id. at 1301.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1309.
51. Id. at 1309-10. The court opined that the only reasonable interpretation of the
phrase is that:
[B]y opposing gun control, and in this instance particularly, by impeding the appointment of a gun control advocate to an influential law enforcement position, the NRA
has participated in effectively permitting the continuation of violent crime in this
society. It is frankly immaterial whether the editorial writer is correct in contending
either that the failure to control the availability of weapons increases violent crime,
or that the NRA's opposition to gun control contributes to the atmosphere in which
such crime flourishes; these assertions are plainly nothing more than opinions, and
the inferences which have been culled therefrom by Plaintiff are so" 'strained, unreasonable and unjustified,'" Loeb v. New Times Communication Group, 497 F. Supp.
85, 90 (S.D. N.Y. 1980) (citations omitted), that they cannot be credited.
Id. at 1310.
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the editorial's listing of Oswald, Jones and Speck was simply an
effort to give examples of the type of people who are dangerous to
society.52 To read the editorial as implying that the NRA wants
firearms to be sold to those individuals "borders on the absurd,
and would require a deviation from the express, plainly articulated
meaning of the editorial."58 The court explained:
Interpreting the editorial in the manner advanced by Plaintiff would additionally require an act of divine intervention, at least with regard to the sale
of arms to Oswald and Jones, since it is apparently undisputed that these
individuals were not among the living at the time of the publications in
question. Moreover, the conclusion that these nefarious murderers were
listed solely as examples of persons who committed violent crimes rather
than as persons whom the NRA advocates selling guns is underscored by
the fact that Speck's particular crimes were committed with a knife rather
54
than with a gun.

NRA appears to represent a subtle, yet important relationship to
the opinion doctrine regarding the extent to which a court will consider inferences from the actual wording of the communication in
question. The NRA alleged that a "reasonable factual inference"
could be derived from the editorial that the NRA promotes violation of firearms laws by encouraging their sale to convicted
felons. 55 The court responded that no such inference could rationally be extracted from the language used in the editorial."6 Thus,
the court would not allow the drawing of unreasonable inferences
of fact to circumvent the constitutional protection to which opinion is entitled.
Another case exemplifying the extensive protection provided by
the opinion doctrine is Pring v. Penthouse International, Limited.5 7 The allegedly defamatory communication in this case consisted of an article appearing in Penthouse magazine which dealt
with the Miss America Pageant and "Charlene," a Miss Wyoming
at the contest.58 The article begins its story with Charlene and
other pageant contestants at a bar where Charlene is having a conversation with her coach, Corky.59 The story then switches to the
52. Id. at 1311.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1311 n.24.
55. Id. at 1306.
56. Id. at 1311.
57. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
58. Id. at 439. Penthouse contended that the article was nothing more than a spoof of
the contest which represented a complete fantasy which could not be taken literally. Id.
59.
Id. at 440-41.
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contest as Charlene is about to go on stage and perform as a baton
twirler.6 0 She is thinking about an incident back in Wyoming when
she performed fellatio on a football player, causing him to levitate." Charlene then performs a fellatio-like act on her baton
which stops the orchestra. 2 Although she does not make the finals,
she tells Corky and some other contestants that she believes she
has a "real talent." 63
A third incident is then described. Charlene is at the edge of the
stage while the finals are underway, thinking of how she would
"save the world" with her talent by performing on the entire Soviet Central Committee, Marshall Tito and Fidel Castro." The article then describes Charlene's act of fellatio performed on Corky
at the edge of the stage while the audience applauds the Miss
America in center stage.65 The story says that the television cameras were not on the newly crowned winner of the pageant, but
instead "remained" on Charlene and her coach who was rising into
the air. 6
Miss Pring, an actual Miss Wyoming who was a beauty pageant
contestant, sued Penthouse, alleging that the net effect of the article was to create the impression that she performed fellatio on her
coach, Corky Corcoran, on national television at the Miss America
Pageant.6 ' She alleged that the article also created the impression
that she committed fellatio-like acts on her baton at the pageant.6 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit began
and ended its analysis with a consideration of whether the story
could reasonably be understood as describing actual facts or events
about the plaintiff or actual conduct of the plaintiff. 9 This is, of
course, a statement of the opinion doctrine since a negative response to the question would lead to a verdict for the defendant.
Calling the article a "complete fantasy," the court held that the
descriptions contained therein were "no more than rhetorical hy60. Id. at 441.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 439-40. The court briefly discussed the issue of whether the publication was
of and concerning the plaintiff as a matter of identity. Id. Regarding this, the court held
that the jury finding that the article referred to Miss Pring was supported by the record. Id.
at 442.
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perbole," and were therefore absolutely protected by the opinion
doctrine.7 0 The court seemed to rest its decision on two independent bases. The first of these can best be described as the overall
tone basis, i.e., it was obvious from the extensive description of
Charelene's thoughts and other indications that the article did not
purport to render a factual account.7 1 The second basis was that
some of the incidents were described as taking place on national
72
television and in front of all or part of the pageant audience.
"This in itself would seem to provide a sufficient signal that the
story could not be taken literally, and the portions charged as defamatory could not reasonably be understood as a statement of
fact. 7 The allegedly defamatory portions of the story described
something physically impossible in an impossible setting.74 The
court then stated:
In these circumstances we must reach the same conclusion, as did the Court
in Greenbelt, that it is simply impossible to believe that a reader would not
have understood that the charged portions were pure fantasy and nothing
else. It is impossible to believe that anyone could understand that levitation
could be accomplished by oral sex before a national television audience or
anyone else. The incidents charged were impossible. The setting was
75
impossible.

In conclusion to Section II A above, reference is made to speech
which I have categorized as "non-mainstream opinion." Pring
clearly falls within that category and may accordingly trouble
many a reader. However, it is important to recognize that the
court's decision does not represent condonation or encouragement
of this type of speech. What it does represent is the preservation of
an unbiased, robust first amendment which protects outrageous
opinion devoid of redeeming value and published in a "vulgar magazine. 17 6 Recognizant of the disturbing potential of its decision, the
Pring court explained:
The story is a gross, unpleasant, crude, distorted attempt to ridicule the
Miss America contest and contestants. It has no redeeming features
whatever. There is no accounting for the vast divergence in views and ideas.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 443.
at 441.
at 443.
(citing Winter v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948)). In Winter, the Supreme

Court held that "vulgar magazines" must be afforded first amendment protection despite
the many disparate views they contain. Id.
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However, the First Amendment was intended to cover them all. The First
Amendment is not limited to ideas, statements, or positions which are accepted; which are not outrageous; which are decent and popular; which are
constructive or have some redeeming element; or which do not deviate from
community standards and norms; or which are within prevailing religious or
moral standards. Although a story may be repugnant in the extreme to an
ordinary reader, and we have encountered no difficulty in placing this story
in such a category, the typical standards and doctrines under the First
Amendment must nevertheless be applied. The magazine itself should not
have been tried for its moral standards. Again, no matter how great its divergence may seem from prevailing standards, this does not prevent the application of the First Amendment. The First Amendment standards are not
adjusted to the particular type of publication or particular subject matter.
. . . The gross nature of the article here concerned makes an objective analysis of the law difficult, but we do not make a moral judgment as to this
magazine, or other writings of this author, nor on the article generally as
77
plaintiff urges by her brief.

C. DistinguishingStatements of Fact From Opinion,
Rhetorical Hyperbole and Vigorous Epithets
Categorization of speech as factual or non-factual is always critical to the success of a tort action.78 To make this distinction, the

courts have employed several tests.
The test most frequently applied in these situations is often referred to as the "reasonably understood" test. Simply stated, the
crucial question under this test is whether the speech in question
can be reasonably understood as describing actual facts or events
about the plaintiff or actual conduct of the plaintiff.79 If the answer is no, judgment for the defendant must be entered, since the
speech in question is absolutely protected as opinion.80 If the answer is yes, analysis of the plaintiff's claim will proceed.
The "reasonably understood" test was applied in most of the
cases that have been discussed above.8" The problem with using
this standard as an analytical barometer is that it is quite vague
77. Pring, 695 F.2d at 443.
78. The categorization is outcome determinative if the court concludes that the speech
is non-factual. See, e.g., the cases cited supra note 44, as well as Greenbelt and Letter Carriers discussed supra.
79. See, e.g., Pring, 695 F.2d at 439.
80. It should be noted that there is no legal reason to distinguish opinion from rhetorical hyperbole or vigorous epithets since, for constitutional purposes, they are synonymous.
81. See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Old
Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 265 (1974);
National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Pring
v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
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and open to the subjective interpretation of each particular court.
It becomes a factual, rather than a legal standard, a situation not
uncommon to constitutional jurisprudence. Accordingly, the particular facts of each case in which this test is applied are very important for purposes of subsequent analogical reasoning and
argumentation.
While the "reasonably understood" test is most frequently applied when these issues arise, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has adopted a different approach. This approach, which may be referred to as the "totality of the circumstances" test, identifies three factors important in determining
whether a statement expresses fact or opinion.82 First, since speech
is not actionable unless understood in a defamatory sense, the
words alone are not determinative; the facts surrounding the publication must also be considered."' Second, even apparent statements of fact may assume the character of statements of opinion,
and thus be privileged, when made under circumstances in which
an audience may reasonably anticipate that the parties will try to
persuade others of their position by using vigorous epithets, fiery
rhetoric or hyperbole. 8 Examples of such situations would include
public debates, as in Greenbelt, and labor disputes, as in Letter
Carriers.s3 Third, the language itself must be scrutinized.
Where the language of the statement is 'cautiously phrased in terms of apparency' or is of a kind typically generated in a spirited legal dispute in
which the judgment, loyalties and subjective motives of the parties are reciprocally attacked and defended in the media and other public forums, the
statement is less likely to be understood as a statement of fact rather than
as a statement of opinion.86

The Ninth Circuit summarized its "totality of the circumstances" test as follows:
In sum, the test to be applied in determining whether an allegedly defamatory statement constitutes an actionable statement of fact requires that the
court examine the statement in its totality in the context in which it was
uttered or published. The court must consider all the words used, not
merely a particular phrase or sentence. In addition, the court must give
weight to cautionary terms used by the person publishing the statement.
82. See Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1983); Information Control v.
Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1980).
83. Lewis, 710 F.2d at 553 (citing Information Control, 611 F.2d at 783).
84. Lewis, 710 F.2d at 553 (citing Information Control, 611 F.2d at 784).
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 603, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 641, 645, 552 P.2d 425, 429 (1976)).
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Finally, the court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the
statement, including the medium by which the statement is disseminated
and the audience to which it is published.8"

The "totality of circumstances" test can be read as a more specific enunciation of the "reasonably understood" test, since the
three factors may be considered by a court applying the latter
standard. The factors, therefore, are important to potential litigants both within and outside the Ninth Circuit. Even if a case
comes up in another jurisdiction utilizing the "reasonably understood" test, persuasive use of the factors may convince the court
that the speech in question is or is not capable of a reasonable
understanding that it conveys factual statements.
III. OPINION V. OUTRAGE-APPLICATION OF THE OPINION DOCTRINE
TO THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Falwell v. Flynt s represented a case of first impression for the
United States Supreme Court. At issue in the case was a conflict
between the absolute first amendment constitutional protection afforded by the opinion doctrine and the state's interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress.
To truly gain an understanding of the extensive protection the
opinion doctrine provides, a factual background of Falwell is necessary. The lawsuit arose out of an "ad parody" appearing in the
November, 1983, and March, 1984, issues of Hustler magazine,
which is published by Larry Flynt and Hustler Magazine, Inc., and
distributed by Flynt Distributing Company. 89 The butt of this parody was Jerry Falwell, anationally known minister who has been
active as a commentator on politics and public affairs. 90 Falwell
sued on three distinct legal bases: libel, invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.9
The district court directed a verdict against Falwell on the privacy claim and sent the other two claims to the jury.9 2 The jury
87. Information Control, 611 F.2d at 784.
88. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
89. Falwell v. Flint, 797 F.2d 1270, 1272 (4th Cir. 1986). Larry Flynt, Hustler Magazine, Inc. and Flynt Distributing Company were all named as defendants by Falwell when
the suit was filed. Id. at 1270.
90. Id. at 1272.
91. Id.
92. Id. Falwell's invasion of privacy claim was brought under VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40
(1984), which creates a cause of action for damages arising from the use of a person's name
or likeness for purposes of trade or advertising without his consent. Falwell, 797 F.2d at
1273. The district court ruled that the parody did use Falwell's name and likeness, but that
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returned a verdict for Flynt on the libel claim, finding that no reasonable person would believe that the parody was describing actual
facts about Falwell. 3 Regarding the emotional distress claim, the
jury returned a verdict against Flynt and Hustler, but not Flynt
Distributing Company.' The jury awarded Falwell $100,000 in actual damages, $50,000 in punitive damages against Flynt and
$50,000 in punitive damages against Hustler.5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, ruling that the issue was
whether the ad's publication was sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. 6 In answering yes,
the court rejected Flynt's argument that the ad was an opinion
protected by the first amendment. 7
The ad parody published by Flynt attempted to satirize an advertising campaign for Campari Liqueur, in which celebrities talk
about their "first time.

'9 8

Although it becomes apparent by the

end of each interview that the reference is to the first time they
tried Campari, the ads clearly play on the sexual double entendre.99 The Hustler parody copied the form and layout of these ads,
and featured an alleged interview with Falwell in which he states
that his "first time" was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous
with his mother in an outhouse. 00 The parody portrays, Falwell
and his mother as drunk and immoral and suggests that he only
0 " At the bottom of the page is a dispreaches when he is drunk."
claimer stating "ad parody-not to be taken seriously."'0 2 The
magazine's table of contents lists the parody as "Fiction; Ad and
Personality Parody."' 03
The Supreme Court held that the state's interest in protecting
public figures from emotional distress is not strong enough to overthe use was not for purposes of trade within the meaning of the statute. Id.
93. Id.

94. Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
108 S.

1276.
1275-76.
1272.
Ct. at 878.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102.
103.

Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1272.
Id. If it is not already apparent, many similarities exist between Pring, discussed

supra at notes 57-77 and accompanying text, and Falwell. One of those similarities is that
the Pring article was categorized as "Humor" in the Penthouse table of contents and that
the Falwell parody was also denoted as being purely fictional in the table of contents.
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ride first amendment protection of speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury if that speech could
not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts
about the public figure involved."" This represents a clear adoption of the "reasonably understood" test discussed above. 01° The
key to this whole case lies in the jury's decision that no reasonable
reader could have believed the ad to be stating facts about
Falwell. 0 1 Once the jury came to that conclusion, any attempt by
Falwell to recover damages based on the ad parody was doomed to
fail.
In rendering its opinion, the Court appears to have been sensitive to the likelihood of suppression of "non-mainstream opinions, "107 and the long-standing constitutional commitment to protection of outrageous speech. The Court stated: "Outrageousness in
the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on
the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of
their dislike of a particular expression.' 0 8 An outrageousness standard therefore violates the Court's longstanding refusal to allow
damages to be awarded because the speech may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience. 0 9
In addition to resting its decision on the opinion doctine, the
Court also concluded that public figures and officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by
reason of publications like the Hustler parody without showing in
104. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 879.
105. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
106. It should be noted that the Court did not enter into an independent categorizational analysis of whether the ad was factual or opinion. Rather, it accepted the lower
court's finding per se. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 880.
107. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-504 (1984), quoted in Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at
879 ("The freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty - and thus
a good unto itself - but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of
society as a whole.").
108. 108 S. Ct. at 882.
109. Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (speech
doesn't lose its protected character simply because it may embarass others); FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) ("[Tlhe fact that society may find speech offensive
is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives
offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a
central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas."); Street v. New York, 391 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly settled that
... the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers.")).
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addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact
which was made with "actual malice." 110 In commenting on this
standard, the Court stated: "This is not merely a blind application
of the New York Timis standard, it reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate 'breathing
space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." '
The fact that the Court made a false statement of fact a necessary prerequisite to a public figure's recovery for emotional distress
when suing a media defendant clearly evidences that the opinion
doctrine is alive and well in distress as well as defamation cases.
This further illustrates the argument that this doctrine is an absolute constitutional safeguard, not simply a concept embodied in
defamation law.11 2 However, any discussion of the New York

Times actual malice standard was surplusage and unnecessary. As
Justice White stated in his brief concurrence:
As I see it, the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan has little to do with
this case, for here the jury found that the ad contained no assertion of fact.
But I agree with the Court that the judgment below, which penalized the
publication of the parody, cannot be squared with the First Amendment. "

We have already made the point that the fact/opinion categorization is the first step in constitutional analysis.1 14 Therefore, once
the Court accepted the district court's jury finding that the Hustler parody was not a statement of fact, there was no need to enter
the realm of the actual malice standard and how it might apply to
emotional distress cases.113
110. 108 S. Ct. at 882.
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
113. 108 S. Ct. at 883 (citation omitted).
114. See supra notes 33-34, 69 and accompanying text.
115. The Fourth Circuit also engaged in a rather lengthy, albeit irrelevant, discussion
of the New York Times actual malice standard once they improperly dismissed the relevance and application of the opinion doctrine. Falwell, 797 F. 2d at 1273-76. The court held
that since the first element of intentional inflction of emotional distress requires that the
misconduct be intentional or reckless, this precisely equates the level of fault that New York
Times requires. Id. at 1275. The court therefore opined:
We, therefore, hold that when the first amendment requires application of the actual
malice standard, the standard is met when the jury finds that the defendant's intentional or reckless misconduct has proximately caused the injury complained of. The
jury made such a finding here, and thus the constitutional standard is satisfied.
Id.
This analysis is seriously flawed. The New York Times actual malice standard mandates
that the plaintiff prove that the defendant made the statement knowing it was false or recklessly disregarding whether it was false or not. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Therefore, the
mental element in New York Times relates to the truthfulness of the communication. The
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The Falwell case answers the question of whether the opinion
doctrine applies to a claim of emotional distress by a public figure" 6 against a media defendant. But, if the defendant in Falwell
was a private figure rather than a public figure, would the opinion
doctrine have saved Flynt and Hustler? In my opinion, the answer
would be yes. As discussed above, Letter Carriers represents an
extension of the opinion doctrine to include private figures."' We
also said that Greenbelt and Letter Carriers, taken together,
clearly establish that the doctrine applies equally to all plaintiffs,
regardless of status."" Falwell can therefore be seen as the Greenbelt of emotional distress since it is the first case to apply the doctrine in this area." 9 It follows, then, that the holding in Falwell
will be extended in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases
instituted by private figures much the same way as the GreenbeltLetter Carriers progression took place in defamation law.
Another compelling reason why the opinion doctrine should apply to the hypothetical proposed above has already been discussed.
Once it is understood that this doctrine is embodied within constitutional law, not defamation law, the involvement of emotional distress in a case becomes irrelevant. Accordingly, the doctrine will
thwart lawsuits in other areas of tort law (e.g. invasion of privacy)
that may foreseeably form the basis of a lawsuit arising out of similar factual situations.
An effective way to understand the significance of a particular
legal doctrine is to hypothesize about the outcome of a case as if
the doctrine had not existed. Applying this tactic to Falwell, the
question becomes whether Falwell's claim satisfies the essential elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 2 0 In Virginia,
mental element in the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, while semantically
similar to New York Times (i.e. intentional or reckless), relates to the wrongdoer's conduct
which is the cause of the plaintiff's emotional distress. This is not even remotely similar to a
mental element that pertains to the truth of a statement. Therefore, the court of appeals'
conclusion that the satisfaction of the mental element with respect to emotional distress
automatically satisfies the New York Times actual malice standard was clearly erroneous.
116. The Supreme Court's opinion consistently reminds the reader that Falwell was a
public figure. In fact, the terms "public figure" and "public official" are used thirteen times
throughout the opinion.
117. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
119. Greenbelt was the first case to apply the doctrine to the area of defamation law.
120. By way of background, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is
rather new and controversial. The tort was first recognized as a component of American tort
law in 1948. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1948 Supp.). However, the fear that the
"floodgates of litigation" would open as a result of this recognition is readily apparent upon
a plain reading of comment d to § 46 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:
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where Falwell's cause of action originated, the elements of an emotional distress claim are that the wrongdoer's conduct: (1) is intentional or reckless; (2) offends generally accepted standards of decency or morality; (3) is causally connected with plaintiff's
emotional
distress; and (4) caused emotional distress that was
1
12

severe.

Flynt testified that he intended to cause Falwell emotional distress.12 2 Depending on how credible the jury found Flynt's testimony on this point, s the first element could have been satisfied.12s Further evidence of Flynt's intention lies in Flynt's
23
republication of the ad parody after Falwell filed his lawsuit.1
The second element, offensiveness/outrageousness, is clearly satisfied by a plain reading of the parody itself. The third and fourth
elements require a showing that the defendant's conduct proximately caused severe emotional distress. When asked about his reaction to the ad, Falwell testified that he was angry, hurt, felt like
weeping and might have physically attacked Flynt if he was nearby
when Falwell first saw the parody.2 6 Furthermore, a colleague of
[L]iability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally,
the case is one in which the recitation of facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the action and lead him to exclaim
"Outrageous!"
The liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities. . . There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
121. See Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1275 n.4 (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210
S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974)). As a more general point of reference, § 46 of the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS (1965), provides that: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability
for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm." Id. Therefore, four elements must be proven under § 46: "(1) the conduct must be
extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (3) it must cause
emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be severe." Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1273 (3d Cir. 1979).
122. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1276. In his deposition, Flynt testified that he wanted to
"upset" Falwell and "assassinate" his integrity. Id. at 1273.
123. The reader should not assume Flynt's level of credibility on the videotaped deposition. During the deposition, Flynt identified himself as Christopher Columbus Cornwallis
I.P.Q. Harvey H. Apache Pugh and said that the parody was authored by Yoko Ono and
Billy Idol. Id.
124. Id. at 1276.
125. Id.
126. Id. Falwel's testimony regarding his reaction to the parody was as follows:
A. I think I have never been as angry as I was as that moment... My anger became
more rational and deep hurt. I somehow felt that in all my life I have never believed
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Falwell's, Dr. Ron Goodwin, testified that Falwell's enthusiasm,
optimism, and ability to concentrate on the many details of running his extensive ministry were diminished.127 Again, dependent
on its credibility, this testimony might allow a jury to find that the
parody was the proximate cause of severe stress for Falwell.21
But, did Falwell really suffer "severe" distress? The answer calls
for a subjective determination on the part of the juror. For example, certain individuals might feel that one suffering severe distress
would not be able to continue functioning in their daily business
and personal lives. Furthermore, some might feel that the distressed target of allegedly distressing material would not personally republish it to a national audience. Under this type of scrutiny, Falwell's claim would most certainly fail. I base this opinion
on the factual background of another lawsuit between Flynt and
Falwell based on the same Hustler parody. Hustler Magazine, In2 9 involved an action
corporated v. Moral Majority, Incorporated"
for copyright infringement brought by Flynt against Falwell when
the latter reproduced the Hustler parody.1 30 The communications
allegedly infringing Hustler's copyright occurred in a mass of letters and television appeals. 31 On November 15, 1983, Falwell sent
two seperate mass mailings to Moral Majority members.132 One set
went to 458,370 "rank-and-file donors," who were asked to contribute up to $50; the other went to 26,980 "major donors," who were
that human beings could do something like this. I really felt like weeping. I am not a
deeply emotional person; I don't show it. I think I felt like weeping. Q. How long did
this sense of anger last? A. To this present moment. Q. You say that it almost
brought you to tears. In your whole life, Mr. Falwell, had you ever had a personal
experience of such intensity that could compare with the feeling that you had when
you saw this ad? A. Never had. Since I have been a Christian I don't think I have
ever intentionally hurt anybody. I am sure I have hurt people but not with intent. I
certainly have never physically attacked anyone in my life. I really think that at that
moment if Larry Flynt had been nearby I might have physically reacted.

Id.
127. Id. at 1277.
128. Id.
129. 606 F. Supp. 1526 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
130. Id. at 1526-27. While on the issue of copyright, it should be noted that the Hustler parody did include Campari's copyright notice. Id. at 1529. The copyright certificate for
Hustler's November issue was registered by the Copyright Office on October 3, 1983. Id. On
October 7, 1983, the chairman of Campari's advertising agency wrote to Flynt, complaining
with "great shock and dismay" of the parody and demanding that Hustler stop using the
Campari label in any manner. Id. Flynt's answer? He republished the parody in the March,
1984 issue of Hustler. Id.
131. Id. at 1530.
132. Id.
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asked for $500.111
The contents of the two mailings were nearly identical.134 Falwell
reported the "tasteless and libelous attack on my mother and me"
by "Porno King Larry Flynt" and requested contributions to wage
a legal battle against him. 135 A copy of the photograph of his
mother was also included. 136
The two mailings differed, however, in that the rank-and-file solicitation
merely described the ad parody, while the major-donor version actually included a copy of the item, with several particularly objectionable words edited out. The letter asked that the recipient destroy the copy after reading
137
it. The major-donor solicitation brought in nearly $45,000 in donations.

Falwell then sent out another mailing, this time to 725,586 followers of the Old Time Gospel Hour, which included a similarly
edited copy of the parody. 138 This letter sought funds for a "survival fund" (not legal battles) established to finance Falwell's television and radio network." 9 More than $672,000 was received in
response to this appeal."1 0 On two other Gospel Hours, Falwell continued his "survival fund" financial pitches in which he held up
the November issue of Hustler, revealing the parody to the audience."' No figures were provided to the court on the financial re42
sponse to these appeals."
Falwell claimed that he needed to mail the ad to his followers to
give them the necessary information to rebut its contents in case
they were confronted by someone who saw the ad. 143 He therefore
classified the appeal for money as nothing more than an ancillary
motive."4 To the contrary, Old Time Gospel Hour's chief executive
officer, Dewitt H. Braud, revealed in his deposition that sending
along an actual copy of the parody was part of Falwell's "marketing approach" to fund-raising. 1 5 Further, Godwin, Moral Majority's executive vice-president, agreed that raising money was a pur133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.

138. Id. This mailing occurred on November 18, 1983. Id.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id. This took place on the December 4 and 11, 1983 programs. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pose of the letter. 46
The court held that Falwell's reproduction of the ad constituted
a fair use under the copyright laws. 1 7 For our purposes, the holding is irrelevant. The factual background of Moral Majority does
appear relevant to the issue of whether Falwell's distress was severe, thus satisfying the fourth element of a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. In my opinion, one suffering severe
emotional distress does not reproduce material which he/she considers defamatory, an invasion of privacy and the cause of severe
personal distress, and mail it to over one million people who would
probably not have otherwise seen it. That person would not hold
the material up in front of a television camera on two occasions for
a widespread audience to see either. That person would probably
not use the material as part of a money-making scheme. But Jerry
Falwell did all these things. Falwell made the ad available, directly
and through television, to a huge national audience. Are these the
actions of a man suffering "severe" emotional distress? You be the
judge.
Whether or not you believe Falwell suffered "severe" distress,
the Court's failure to reach the issue exemplifies the power of the
opinion doctrine. This again illustrates perhaps the most important point regarding the doctrine: it is the first analytical step in
the jurisprudential journey. Once it's opinion, it's protected.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Summarily stated, the opinion doctrine mandates that non-factual
assertions be afforded absolute constitutional protection. The doctrine will protect even the most outrageous opinion,'4 8 regardless of
whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure,'149 and irrespective of the area of tort law under which the plaintiff chooses to
6 2
sue. 6'
Read together, Greenbelt,'5 ' Letter Carriers
and
5
3
Falwell clearly support this proposition.
The categorization of the material at issue as factual or non-factual (opinion, rhetorical hyperbole or vigorous epithet) is the cru146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id. at 1526-27.
See supra notes 43, 76-77, 107-108 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
See text between footnotes 119 and 120.
See supra notes 8-25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 88-115 and accompanying text.
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cial first step in the constitutional analytical structure."" Although
the rather general "reasonably understood" test has gained wide
acceptance in making this determination, 155 consultation of the
specific factors enunciated in the Ninth Circuit's "totality of circumstances" test is suggested regardless of jurisdiction. 156
The significance, power and breadth of the opinion doctrine are
vividly illustrated by the protection of what many would consider
the utterly outrageous and offensive non-factual assertions made in
1 57
Pring
and Falwell. 5' Lest one be disturbed by these cases, the
doctrine should gain widespread acceptance based upon the notion
that the greater good of potential societal growth and enlightenment, stimulated by provocative "non-mainstream opinion," must
59
be cherished and preserved.
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156.
157.
158.
159.
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